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Abstract
We present a new software architecture in which all concepts
necessary to achieve fault tolerance can be added to an appli-
cation automatically without any source code changes. As a
case study, we consider the problem of providing a reliable
service despite node failures by executing a group of replicat-
ed servers. Replica creation and management as well as fail-
ure detection and recovery are performed automatically by a
separate fault tolerance layer (ft-layer) which is inserted be-
tween the server application and the operating system kernel.
The layer is invisible for the application since it provides the
same functional interface as the operating system kernel, thus
making the fault tolerance property of the service completely
transparent for the application. A major advantage of our ar-
chitecture is that the layer encapsulates both fault tolerance
mechanisms and policies. This allows for maximum flexibility
in the choice of appropriate methods for fault tolerance with-
out any changes in the application code.
1. Motivation
Due to the steadily increasing complexity of applica-
tion programs more and more sophisticated concepts are
required to make these programs resistent against system
component failures. During the past years several methods
for achieving this fault tolerance have been developed and
meanwhile are well understood. Basic concepts which are
necessary for reliable applications have been identified
and thoroughly studied (process surveillance [Bec91],
membership information distribution [Cri91], checkpoint-
ing and recovery [KoT87], reliable and order-preserving
multicast protocols [BeG93], various replication mecha-
nisms [Pow91], etc.).
However, up to now little has been done to support a
non-expert application programmer in building reliable
applications. Although their development is facilitated by
toolkits (e.g. the ISIS toolkit [BiJ87]) which provide the
basic building blocks of fault tolerance, the programmer
still requires precise knowledge of the concepts imple-
mented by these toolkits in order to use them successfully.
Even with the help of toolkits, fault tolerance policies and
mechanisms still have to be programmed explicitly as part
of the application code. This close interrelation of the fault
tolerance mechanisms and the application code has two se-
vere drawbacks:
• Distributed fault tolerant applications become much
more difficult to test because the implemented fault
tolerance concepts have to be taken into account when
selecting proper test scenarios. Often the failure han-
dling parts of such an application are particularly
difficult to test as subtle combinations of failure situa-
tions have to be simulated.
• Once the fault tolerance policy is chosen, the applica-
tion is restricted only to this choice. Switching to a
different policy (e.g. from passive replication by a pri-
mary-backup scheme to active replication) is usually
infeasible without a complete application redesign.
The second argument is even more important if fault
tolerance concepts are provided directly by the underlying
operating system. In this case, all applications are restrict-
ed to only these mechanisms, regardless of their specific
reliability requirements.
In this paper we present an approach to support pro-
grammers which are not familiar with fault tolerance con-
cepts in building reliable applications. Our approach aims
at making all reliability mechanisms application-indepen-
dent and completely transparent for the application. With
this approach the application programmer is relieved from
implementing any fault tolerance related mechanisms by
himself. Applications can thus be developed without hav-
ing fault tolerance in mind, and all mechanisms needed to
achieve and preserve the capability of tolerating system
failures are added to a non-fault-tolerant application auto-
matically without any changes of the program code. These
reliability mechanisms are encapsulated within a separate
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layer which is provided to the application in form of a li-
brary. Different fault tolerance strategies can be imple-
mented in different libraries, provided that the interface for
the application does not change.
With this concept our approach offers a very flexible
way of choosing various replication policies and mecha-
nisms by simply selecting the corresponding library and
linking it to the application code. In addition, testing of an
application is substantially simplified. It is sufficient to
test the non-fault tolerant application before linking it with
one of the fault tolerance libraries, so that the code used to
provide the reliability properties does not have to be con-
sidered in the test scenarios. Hence, testing can be restrict-
ed to the (non-fault-tolerant) functional part of the applica-
tion. Failure cases may be disregarded, since these cases
are handled within the ft-layer.
2. System model
For our approach we have chosen a very general com-
putational model in order to make our concepts applicable
for a wide range of systems. Our model is similar to the
ones used e.g. in Eden, CONIC, Mach or Chorus. The
computational entities are teams of processes which share
a common address space. This common address space to-
gether with synchronization primitives based on sema-
phores can be used for efficient process communication
within a single team.
Processes of different teams can only communicate
with each other by message exchange. A message is sent
to a single port (point-to-point message) or a port group
(multicast message). Each port is owned by the team by
which it was created, and only this team may receive mes-
sages from the port. A port group may comprise an arbi-
trary number of ports. The communication subsystem is
assumed to provide an unreliable message transmission
service, i.e. messages may be delayed or lost sporadically.
However, if a message arrives at its recipient, its contents
is uncorrupted. Based on this datagram service we assume
the existence of a more reliable communication service ac-
cording to a remote procedure call protocol which guaran-
tees that a message is delivered at most once.
Teams are the unit of distribution and failure (i.e. all
processes of a team execute on the same node, and a team
failure causes all processes of the team to fail). Further-
more, it is assumed that teams fail silently, i.e. that they ex-
hibit crash failure semantics [Cri91].
With our system proposed in the sequel we can tolerate
up to n independent failures (both team failures and mes-
sage losses) before the system has recovered from these
failures and regains its capability to handle subsequent
failures correctly. The value of n can be specified before
the service is initially configured.
3. System architecture
We describe our system architecture in terms of a cli-
ent-server model which is based on a modern micro-ker-
nel. In this model, on each node of the network the operat-
ing system kernel provides a functional interface for the
client and server applications. Interaction between these
applications is only possible by calling the communication
facilities offered by the kernel (Fig. 1).
In order to make a service resilient to system compo-
nent failures, several servers providing this service are ex-
ecuted on distinct nodes of the system. Such a set of serv-
ers cooperating in a single service is called a server group.
In case that one or more of these servers fail, one of the re-
maining group members can still provide the service to the
clients.
Our major goal was to make all fault tolerance mecha-
nisms transparent to the application programmer. We
therefore have developed a fault tolerance layer (ft-layer)
which is inserted between each member of the server
group and its underlying operating system kernel. This
layer provides the same functional interface to the applica-
tion as the kernel, but internally enhances the semantics of
the kernel functions, depending on the fault tolerance
properties implemented by the layer (Fig. 2). Since the
functional interfaces of the ft-layer and the original operat-
ing system kernel are identical, the ft-layer is completely
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invisible for the application and hence can easily be substi-
tuted by an ft-layer implementing a different reliability
concept.
The ft-layer encapsulates all basic building blocks
which are necessary for a fault tolerant application. These
building blocks are:
- Service configuration. The ft-layer is responsible for
the initial configuration of the service according to
configuration-specific parameters (e.g. the number of
faults to tolerate during a specific time interval). This
includes the automatic replication of a server and the
mapping of the replicas on distinct nodes of the net-
work.
- Group member surveillance. All server replicas
form a group and are kept under surveillance to detect
failures as soon as possible. If group membership
changes, membership information is updated and dis-
tributed among the remaining group members consis-
tently. This guarantees that each group member has the
same membership view.
- Service reconfiguration after failures. In case that a
failure has been detected, recovery actions are invoked
in order to reestablish the desired degree of replication.
The service will be reconfigured automatically by
starting a new server replica for each failed group
member on an operational node. The new replicas are
initialized properly and included into the server group.
- Replica management. Coordination, synchroniza-
tion, and management of the server replicas is handled
within the ft-layer in order to guarantee service consis-
Fig. 2: Fault tolerant server group
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tency conditions induced by the implemented replica-
tion strategy. Note that this is done without semantic
knowledge of the application.
- Input message distribution. Input messages are dis-
tributed to all members of the server group. If neces-
sary, an identical order of message delivery is con-
structed for each recipient using an atomic and order-
preserving multicast protocol.
- Output message selection. If more than one output
message is generated by the server group, the ft-layers
of the server replicas have to agree upon one of these
messages being passed on to its destination. All other
messages are discarded in order to avoid message du-
plication.
Configuration, failure detection and failure recovery
are activities of the ft-layer which must be available at any
time. This requires the ft-layer to be an active component
of the server team. For example, it is essential that the fail-
ure of a server group member is detected as soon as possi-
ble, and recovery from this failure is performed instantly
in order to reestablish the required degree of replication
(and hence the degree of fault tolerance), even if the appli-
cation layers of all servers are currently inactive (e.g. wait-
ing for a new client request). Therefore, the ft-layer does
not only enhance the semantics of the functions provided
by the underlying kernel, but also comprises additional
processes which handle all activities concerned with the
fault tolerance mechanisms. Internal state information of
the ft-layer is kept within a memory region which is sepa-
rated from the address space of the application layer. This
separation is caused by technical reasons which will be
given below.
4. Inside the fault tolerance layer
Although the tasks of the ft-layer have been clearly de-
fined in the previous section, its internal structure strongly
depends on the replication policy and the mechanisms cho-
sen to provide the desired reliability. In the sequel we con-
sider two example layers implementing different policies.
In the first layer we are concerned with a passive replica-
tion scheme consisting of a primary server and an arbitrary
number of backup servers. In the second example, we de-
scribe an ft-layer which provides mechanisms for the rep-
lication of actively executing servers.
4.1. Fault tolerance layer for passive replication
In the passive replication scheme a fault tolerant ser-
vice is initialized by starting a single server which auto-
matically becomes the primary server. Before processing
the first client request the primary configures the service
by starting a group of n-1 identical backup servers on dis-
tinct nodes. The replication degree n is a configuration pa-
rameter which can be specified at service invocation time.
It implicitly defines the maximum number of failures
which the system is capable of tolerating before it has
completely recovered from these failures. In the case of the
ft-layer for passive replication, the maximum number of
tolerated failures is n-1.
The ft-layer of each server group member contains a
surveillance process Surv (Fig. 3). The surveillance pro-
cesses communicate with each other using the surveillance
ports PSurv to detect member failures. We use a protocol
similar to the attendance list membership protocol pro-
posed by Cristian [Cri91a]. The server group is arranged in
a virtual ring on which messages containing the current
membership list circulate from one group member to the
other. Initially the execution of the protocol is controlled
by the primary. A group member failure is suspected by all
surviving members if the membership message fails to ar-
rive after a watchdog timer has expired. In this case, an
agreement protocol [Bec91] is started to select a new pri-
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mary server (or to confirm the old primary if it is still op-
erational). This server is responsible for collection and dis-
tribution of the new membership information and restart of
the surveillance protocol.
After a group member failure a new backup replica is
started and initialized with the state of its creator. If possi-
ble, this is done by one of the remaining backups to mini-
mize the impact of recovery on the service response time.
In order that a backup server which takes over after a
primary failure need not reexecute the whole computation
of the primary, the states of the backups are updated by the
primary at certain instances of time. For this purpose, the
checkpoint process Chp of the primary’s ft-layer sends a
checkpoint to the PChp ports of all backup servers (all PChp
ports are included in a port group to allow multicast com-
munication).
In the primary, the Chp process first suspends all ap-
plication processes and transfers those parts of the applica-
tion state which have changed since the last checkpoint
into a checkpoint message buffer. The decision which part
of the state has changed is based on the value of a dirty-bit
maintained by the memory management unit (mmu) for
each memory page. All dirty-bits are cleared during a
checkpoint. If a memory page has been written since the
last checkpoint, its dirty-bit was set by the mmu, and the
page will be transferred to the backups.
The ft-layer maintains its own state information which
usually differs between primary and backups. Therefore,
this part of the replica state must not be transferred by a
checkpoint. If ft-layer state information were stored on a
memory page of the application layer, checkpointing of
this memory page would destroy ft-layer information in
the backup servers. Therefore, the virtual team address
space is separated into an application part and a part which
is private to the ft-layer. A checkpoint only transfers mem-
ory pages associated with the application layer.
In addition to the address space contents, context in-
formation of the application processes (register contents,
stack pointer, program counter, status information, etc.) is
obtained and stored in the checkpoint message buffer. Fi-
nally, the states of the application ports (i.e. information
about the messages pending at these ports) are copied into
the buffer, and the application processes are resumed.
Subsequently the Chp process multicasts the stored
checkpoint information to all backup replicas. Due to its
size a checkpoint must be split over several messages. A
message sequence number and a two-phase-commit proto-
col are used in order to guarantee that a checkpoint is either
installed entirely at all destination sites so that the backup
states are consistent, or it is not installed at any of them (in
which case the consistent state of the previous checkpoint
is preserved). Only if all backup servers confirm the cor-
rect reception of the checkpoint, a commit message is sent
to the backups. Otherwise an abort message is sent.
In each backup replica the application processes are
suspended as long as the backup does not take over as new
primary. However, the processes of the ft-layer are active.
The Chp process is waiting to receive a new checkpoint at
the PChp port. Upon reception of a checkpoint message, the
message contents is buffered. If a checkpoint message is
missed (which is noticed by a gap in the sequence num-
bers) the message is requested from the checkpoint sender.
As soon as all messages have been received, a confirma-
tion message is returned, and the Chp process waits for a
corresponding checkpoint commit message. Upon recep-
tion of this commit message the new server state is in-
stalled by extracting the state information from the check-
point buffer and copying it into the application address
space. If an abort message is sent, the checkpoint buffer is
cleared.
In non-deterministic applications structured according
to a general computational model such as ours it is an im-
portant problem to decide when a checkpoint must be is-
sued. To avoid inconsistent service behavior, all effects
caused by the repetition of statements after a primary fail-
ure (such as messages already sent by the primary) must
remain invisible for other teams. In addition to that, the
backup which takes over as new primary must perform the
same state transitions as the failed primary since its last
checkpoint to reach the same externally visible state, i.e.
the state which is seen by clients communicating with the
service and by other teams in the service environment. In
particular, state transitions which have been performed as
a result of a non-deterministic decision must be repeated in
the same way by the backup in case of a recovery.
In our ft-layer for passive replication inconsistent ser-
vice behavior is avoided by a method called systematic
checkpointing. In this method, a checkpoint will be issued
whenever the externally visible state changes [Bec92]. In
our model this is only the case if
- a new port is created or an existing port is deleted, or
- a message is sent by the primary.
The corresponding kernel functions of the ft-layer
which overload the functions of the original kernel invoke
the checkpointing mechanism automatically when called
by the application.
Clients issue service requests by sending request mes-
sages to the application ports of the server group. In order
that all server replicas receive the request messages, the
corresponding user ports of each replica form a port group,
and request messages are sent using a reliable multicast
protocol. We do not require preservation of message order,
so the multicast protocol used here can be very efficient.
The receiver process Recv of the primary ft-layer passes
the request messages on to the application processes, while
in the backup servers the messages are buffered in the ft-
layers until either they can be discarded after a subsequent
checkpoint, or one of the backups takes over.
Note that the order of messages need not be identical
in the primary and the backups, since each non-determin-
istic decision caused by the message order will be check-
pointed as soon as it becomes visible outside the primary
server. Therefore, the checkpointing mechanism enforces
consistent message order implicitly by selecting which
messages may be discarded at the backup sites, and which
may not.
4.2. Fault tolerance layer for active replication
Determinism considerations
Applications which are replicated and executed in par-
allel usually are required to be deterministic. However,
guaranteeing determinism even for applications based on a
single-process model is very difficult and expensive in
practice. In particular, the operating system kernel on
which an application is based produces some application
input (e.g. in form of return values of kernel functions).
This information transfer from the kernel to the application
is independent of the system model, and therefore has to be
considered as a source of non-determinism for all applica-
tions. For example, consider a kernel call which is used to
allocate a resource. While some of the application replicas
allocate the resource successfully, other replicas may not
be successful due to a temporary shortage of the resource
on their local nodes. In each replica the information about
the success of the kernel call is transferred to the applica-
tion layer which may use this information to determine the
next state transition. The applications obviously are non-
deterministic, making different state transitions within the
group possible.
It is therefore necessary to either consider non-deter-
ministic applications in general for active replication, or
enforce determinism by a very restrictive model and han-
dle each operating system kernel output as application in-
put. The latter requires extremely close synchronization of
the replicas (at the base of each operating system kernel
call returning a result), thus causing substantial overhead
and reducing service throughput.
Our approach can handle non-deterministic applica-
tions without requiring such a close synchronization of
server replicas. We make the assumption that a service is
intended to produce deterministic output (which is much
weaker than the assumption that a service exhibits deter-
ministic behavior!) and take measures to detect and mask
state divergences of group members if output messages di-
verge. A good example application is a name service
which maps logical service names to physical addresses at
which the services are available. Since the mapping of
names to addresses is unique, service requests for informa-
tion retrieval are deterministic. A client registers a new
service by specifying a service name and the associated
service address, so service registration per se is also a de-
terministic operation. Only if two different clients try to
register a new service at the same time, and both service
requests are processed in parallel by different processes in
each replica, a conflicting decision can be made by the
group members if the same service name is to be used for
two different service addresses. Although this case is rare
enough so that a state divergence based on this conflict is
very unlikely, care must be taken to resolve this conflict
and to hide the effects of this potential non-determinism
from the service environment.
In our approach group member synchronization is re-
quired only if the externally visible state of a service
changes, i.e. if a message is sent by the service or if the ser-
vice port interface changes. In this case the ft-layers inter-
act to agree on the same output of all group members.
Members which disagree will be enforced to adopt the
state from one of the agreeing members. To minimize the
impact of synchronization and masking of non-determinis-
tic decisions on the service response time, we eliminate
sources of non-determinism where possible, thus reducing
the probability of their occurrence. As a simple example,
we take care that process identifiers are identical for corre-
sponding processes in all replicas by using virtual identifi-
ers reflecting the dynamic creation history of the process.
Layer architecture
In the active replication scheme service configuration
is done by the server which is started first. It creates n-1
identical server replicas on different nodes of the network
to establish the server group. As in the case of passive rep-
lication, a surveillance mechanism is initiated to discover
group member failures. This surveillance mechanism is in-
corporated into an atomic multicast layer which is used by
clients for communication with the service and for coordi-
nation purposes within the server group. The atomic mul-
ticast layer has been developed especially for the use with-
in a group of replicated servers and perfectly meets the re-
quirements of our ft-layer [BeG93]. The communication
protocol executed in this layer constructs a consistent or-
der of messages at all ports of each port group by a virtual
token ring connecting all group members. The token is
also used to detect member failures and to distribute mem-
bership information to all group members consistently.
Therefore, an additional surveillance protocol is superflu-
ous. The RecvSurv process of the ft-layer is responsible for
the protocol execution and group member surveillance
(Fig. 4).
If a server failure is detected, the atomic multicast lay-
er generates a crash event. Crash event messages are dis-
seminated among the server group using the atomic multi-
cast protocol and therefore arrive at each group member in
a consistent order. These messages are delivered at the ser-
vice system port PSys of each group member. Upon recep-
tion of a crash event message the Coord processes of all ft-
layers agree on one server which is responsible for creating
a new replica on an operational node. Surveillance of the
new replica is done by its creator until it joins the virtual
ring, causing the atomic multicast layer to generate a join
event message. Like crash events, the join messages are or-
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dered consistently so that each group member receives the
same sequence of changes in the group membership.
The selection of output messages is done by the Voter
process in the ft-layer. Since in our system model each pro-
cess of a team creates an independent stream of output
messages, the Voter processes consider output messages
for each process separately. Our voting protocol is remi-
niscent of the ‘Competitive Validate-before-Propagate
Mode’ protocol proposed in [Pow91]. Instead of being
sent directly by an application process, an output message
is passed on to the local Voter process. Before the message
is actually sent to its destination, the Voter processes send
a claim message to the PSys port group using the atomic
multicast protocol. This claim message contains a signa-
ture of the user message. If a majority of identical claim
messages has been found, the ft-layers agree on one server
replica which actually sends the message, while the other
replicas discard it. Agreement on who is responsible to
send the messages can be easily established based on the
sequence of claim messages arriving at each group mem-
ber in an identical order. After the message was sent, the
success of this operation is disseminated among the group
members by another atomic multicast. This confirmation
is necessary in order to avoid messages to be sent twice af-
ter a failure.
When selecting an output message from the messages
produced by all server replicas in response to a client re-
quest, it must be guaranteed that the sequence of output
messages is consistent. This means that the same sequence
of output messages can be generated by a single server
provided with the same stream of input messages. If all
server replicas have the same internal state before process-
ing a client request, then the result message produced by
any replica may be chosen for being returned to the client.
However, if the server replica states have diverged, then
the choice of any subsequent output message must be re-
stricted to those servers which have agreed with the former
output message. The choice of a different message might
result in a message sequence which cannot be produced by
a single server, thus contradicting the consistency require-
ments of the service output.
Once a server replica has produced a message which is
excluded from this choice, the state of this server may be
inconsistent to the sequence of state transitions performed
up to now, and hence must not be considered any more for
further processing of client requests. Therefore, the degree
of replication and hence the fault tolerance degree are re-
duced.
To compensate this reduction of redundancy we en-
force each group member which does not agree with a se-
lected output message to adopt the internal state of an
agreeing server replica. In such a case the Voter process of
one of the agreeing replicas issues a checkpointing request
to the Chp process, specifying which group member states
have to be adjusted. The Chp process then suspends the ap-
plication processes, copies the application layer state into
a checkpoint message buffer, and resumes the application
processes. Then a checkpoint request message is sent to all
disagreeing group members. Their Chp processes suspend
the application processes and wait for the checkpoint mes-
sages to be sent. After reception of all messages and suc-
cessful installation of the new replica state, the application
processes are resumed.
This adjustment of server replicas to a consistent ser-
vice state also works if the Voter processes cannot find a
majority of output messages. In principle, any output mes-
sage can be selected since our checkpointing mechanism
guarantees that after each output the service is in a consis-
tent state. However, if a majority of server replicas already
agree on a message the overhead of checkpointing is min-
imized.
Since checkpointing a server state reduces the perfor-
mance benefits of active replication, the ft-layer for active
replication is suitable for server applications which exhibit
(externally visible) non-deterministic behavior only in rare
cases. If such a behavior occurs more often, the passive
replication scheme should be used instead, since non-de-
terministic decisions are handled implicitly there by the
checkpoints.
We have chosen the potentially non-deterministic
team model to demonstrate the general applicability of our
approach even for non-deterministic applications. Howev-
er, the overhead caused by the ft-layer can be substantially
reduced if determinism of applications is guaranteed (e.g.
by a restricted system model, deterministic kernel output
handling, etc.). If replica states cannot diverge and all
group members are provided with the same sequence of in-
put messages, a simplified voting strategy can be applied,
and the voter processes may select an arbitrary replica
which actually sends the message (e.g the fastest one pro-
ducing the output). There is no need to collect a majority
of identical messages, and the checkpointing mechanism
becomes completely obsolete.
5. Performance considerations
Our performance considerations are based on the as-
sumption that a service is accessed by a client using a re-
mote procedure call (RPC) like communication pattern.
Therefore, the delay of the service response message im-
posed by the ft-layer should be minimized.
5.1. Passive replication layer
When using a passive replication scheme, in normal
operation mode (i.e. the failure-free cases) a checkpoint is
required whenever the port interface of the service changes
or an output message is sent by the primary server replica.
To hide the impact of the checkpoint caused by the reply
message of the RPC, it would be desirable to send this
checkpoint after the reply. However, if the primary fails
between sending the reply message and the checkpoint
transfer, the backup which takes over may produce and
send a different reply message due to non-deterministic
decisions, which contradicts the demand for service con-
sistency. This can only be avoided if the checkpoint is sent
immediately before the reply message. Then the check-
point guarantees that the same reply message will be re-
peated, should the primary fail. To minimize the probabil-
ity of generating such a message duplication, a confirm
message is sent to all backups to notify them about the suc-
cess of the send operation.
As a consequence, in a passive replication scheme the
client application cannot be prevented from noticing the
effects of checkpointing if the application may generate
non-deterministic output, since a checkpoint must always
be sent between the reception of the service request and
sending the service reply message.
The cost of a checkpoint itself strongly depends on the
service application structure. For instance, each process of
the primary server team has its own stack, which must be
included in the checkpoint if the process has been active
and changed the stack. Therefore, the size of a checkpoint
depends on the number of processes in the primary server.
Similar considerations apply to the number of application
ports. For each port, state information has to be collected
and sent along with the checkpoint. So the checkpoint size
also grows with the number of ports. Finally, another im-
portant factor for the amount of checkpoint data is the size
of a single memory page which determines the granularity
at which changes in the address space must be transferred
to the backups.
Even if the checkpoint data are limited to those pages
which have been modified since the last checkpoint, the to-
tal amount of a checkpoint is significant. It is therefore es-
sential to apply compression methods (like run length en-
coding or methods using shadow pages) before a check-
point is split into messages and sent over the network. The
quality of the applied method is a dominant factor for the
efficiency of a passive replication scheme.
In case of a group member failure, the impact of recov-
ery on the service response time depends on whether the
primary or a backup has failed. If a backup has failed, one
of the remaining backups is responsible for creating a new
replica and initializing it with the last checkpoint, so that a
client will not notice any delay caused by this service re-
configuration.
If, however, the primary server fails, the client will not
get any service response before the failure has been detect-
ed by the backups and a new primary has been selected.
This time is largely determined by the setting of the watch-
dog timer used to detect group member failures. After the
failure has been detected, the election of a new primary can
be performed by n+1 multicasts [Bec91], where n is the
number of the surviving group members. The winner of
the election immediately continues processing the pending
service requests.
5.2. Active replication layer
The advantage of active server replication lies in the
fact that in normal operation mode expensive checkpoint-
ing is not required. Therefore, the delay in service response
time as seen by the client is much smaller than in passive
replication schemes. When using active replication, the
performance overhead for a typical RPC-like client-server
communication pattern is mostly influenced by three caus-
es. First, the service request message must be disseminated
among all server replicas by an atomic and order-preserv-
ing multicast protocol to guarantee service consistency.
Second, after the service request has been processed by the
replicas, they have to agree on one reply message to be
sent back to the client, and on a server which actually
sends the message. This is usually done by a voting algo-
rithm which handles different messages produced by the
server replicas. Finally, the server which has sent the mes-
sage must report the success of this operation to all other
group members to avoid message duplication in case of a
failure.
If servers have produced different output messages,
those servers which do not agree with the selected message
must adopt a new state from one of the other server repli-
cas. As in the case of passive replication, this is done by a
checkpoint which is sent from one of the agreeing replicas
to those who disagree. The size of such an adoption check-
point depends on the application structure. However, al-
though these checkpoints are expected to occur very infre-
quently, they have to transfer the complete team address
space.
In our prototype implementation of the ft-layer for ac-
tive replication, we have measured the average service re-
sponse time for a null RPC, using our atomic multicast
protocol described in [BeG93]. The implementation was
done on top of the experimental MOSKITO operating sys-
tem kernel [NeG90]. The experiments have been per-
formed on SUN 4/25 workstations interconnected by a 10
MBit/s Ethernet. Sender and receiver teams were all run-
ning on distinct nodes, so no local communication was in-
volved.
In these experiments our ft-layer has shown a total ser-
vice delay time of less than 36 ms for a server group of two
replicas, and less than 50 ms for a group consisting of three
servers. Our atomic multicast protocol delivers a broadcast
message after about 10 ms in a ring with two receivers, and
after about 13 ms in a ring with three receivers. Voting as
well as the distribution of the acknowledgment after suc-
cessfully sending the reply message are done using the
atomic multicast protocol, so that three successive atomic
multicast operations influence the service response time.
The numbers given above show that the additional over-
head of the ft-layer without the time used by the atomic
multicast protocol is in the range of 6 to 11 ms for a group
of two or three receivers, respectively.
6. Related Work
Several techniques for achieving fault tolerance have
been described in literature which are similar to ours. In
the ISIS project [BiJ87] a toolkit for the construction of
fault tolerant applications has been developed. This toolkit
comprises a set of atomic broadcast protocols which differ
in their degree of synchronization of the receivers and or-
dering semantics of the messages. A coordinator/cohort
scheme [BiJ87, BCJ90] has been proposed which is based
on these atomic broadcast protocols. In this scheme one
member of a group of communicating processes is selected
to be the coordinator of the group which is responsible to
actually perform a computation on client request. The oth-
er processes serve as passive cohorts which are ready to re-
place the coordinator in case of a failure. Once a coordina-
tor has been selected for a computation, it is impossible for
a new member to join the cohorts. Therefore, the degree of
fault tolerance decreases with each failure during a compu-
tation. In our system, the ft-layer also is responsible to re-
establish the degree of fault tolerance specified at configu-
ration time by creating a new server replica for each failed
one. The aim of the ISIS toolkit was to encapsulate all fault
tolerance mechanisms and make them available to the ap-
plication programmer who still is in charge to implement
the fault tolerance policies. Our ft-layer includes both
mechanisms and policies and thus achieves complete
transparence of the fault tolerance property of a service.
In the Delta-4 project [Pow91] several different fault
tolerance techniques have been investigated. The architec-
ture of fault tolerant applications is similar to the one pro-
posed in this paper. Each server replica is associated with
a “replica coordination entity” which is responsible for the
coordination and management of the replicas. In the pas-
sive replication technique described in [SpB89] the appli-
cation programmer has to specify recovery actions which
are to be taken if the primary has failed while interacting
with its environment other than by message exchange (e.g.
by input / output). Our method of implicit checkpoints tak-
en after each output renders additional recovery actions
unnecessary. The second technique used in Delta-4 is
called the leader-follower model [BHV90]. A software
component is replicated in n identical copies which are all
active. One of the replicas, the leader, takes all (potentially
non-deterministic) decisions before propagating them to
the other replicas, the followers. By exchanging synchro-
nization messages it is guaranteed that the followers al-
ways execute at least one step behind the leader. Finally,
the Delta-4 project also was exploring an active replication
scheme [CPR92]. However, in their scheme, the replicated
software components are required to be deterministic.
For the Conic system [LKE86] a hot standby scheme
is proposed which is similar to our passive replication
technique. In this approach, several copies of an applica-
tion program are distributed on distinct processors. One
copy is active, processing service requests, while the other
copies are waiting to receive checkpoints from the active
one. The detection of failures and the transfer of check-
points is done by hot standby managers which are associ-
ated with each program copy. Service reconfiguration after
a failure is performed by a configuration management ser-
vice consisting of a configuration manager and a status
collector.
7. Conclusions
With our concepts we have shown that the encapsula-
tion of fault tolerance mechanisms in a layer between the
operating system kernel and the application has two main
advantages: First, the reliability mechanisms are provided
in a completely transparent and application-independent
way. Therefore, even complex applications can be devel-
oped regardless of any aspects of fault tolerance, and test-
ing of these applications is simplified substantially. This
minimizes the development time for fault tolerant applica-
tions drastically. Second, replication policies and reliabil-
ity mechanisms can be easily changed without application
redesign by simply choosing a different ft-layer.
In case of active replication, it is necessary to consider
non-deterministic applications, since even in very restric-
tive system models operating system kernel output may
lead to non-deterministic decisions, causing the states of
server replicas to diverge. We have shown that it is suffi-
cient to detect such state divergencies only if they are vis-
ible for the service environment. In this case, disagreeing
server replicas are forced to adopt a new state from the cor-
rect ones, so that the total degree of fault tolerance is not
reduced.
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